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Abstract  
We investigate the effect of state subsidy on the behavior of entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
in a double moral hazard and fixed investment model under positive externalities. We infer that 
investment subsidy and success fee improve the incentives, ease credit rationing, hence boost 
private financing, which explains the popularity of hybrid venture capital systems. The main 
disadvantage of these systems is, however, that the entrepreneur is encouraged to minimize 
his/her own capital investment and to ask for the maximal state subsidy available. It may happen 
that public sources go to entrepreneurs capable to finance their projects privately, so state 
subsidies increase state deficit (and private profits) without any effects on public welfare 
leaving other important areas underfinanced. We also prove that state guarantee definitely 
creates perverse incentives, hence it is not recommended in our model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We distinguish inventor and innovator in an innovation process, the former has a new idea, 
whereas the latter possesses already a patent, a product, a project, or even a formal enterprise 
[Stiglitz-Greenwald, 2014]. The first question arising in economic policy is to decide to what 
extent invention or innovation should be subsidized by the state.  Stiglitz-Greenwald [2014, 
Chapter 6, Appendix D] presents the mutual interaction of the two areas: innovators monopolize 
common knowledge (e.g. by patents), but also improve it by financing industrial research 
projects. Stiglitz-Greenwald [2014] analyze this dynamic interaction through an example of a 
fishpond where fishes symbolize new ideas, and fishermen are the innovators who occasionally 
spend some part of their profit for fish resettlement (invention). They prove that an external 
subsidy to fishermen decreases fish population and creates a steady state where also fishermen’s 
profit will be smaller. Translating it, a subsidy of innovation withers fundamental research 
exhausting the “fishpond” of our common knowledge, and so the intervention will result in an 
opposite effect in the long run: both the level of innovation and the economic growth will get 
lower. It is a commonplace in economics that goods with positive externalities (i.e. with spill-
over social impact), like fundamental research, will suffer underproduction if we leave 
everything to the market. This implies that the state should rather support and finance 
fundamental research than encourage innovation directly. Stiglitz and Greenwald [2014] 
identify a radical review of property rights and more subsidy on export as key tools for 
stimulating innovation. Mazzucato [2012] extends the concept of “entrepreneurial state” and 
describes the role of the state in fostering innovation in an overall strategic framework. In the 
sequel, we put aside this dispute and restrict ourselves to investigate the role of direct state 
subsidy in innovation on project realization. 
The main characteristics of early-stage innovative projects are a high-level risk and uncertainty, 
a sharp asymmetry in information (the entrepreneur knows the project and his own efforts better 
than outer players), and significant positive externalities. These characteristics together make 
innovation much more difficult to finance. On the one hand, negative consequences of 
informational asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection occur increasingly, so both 
contractual incentives and screening and monitoring systems must be set with an extra care 
[Jáki et al., 2017]. On the other hand, requirements of risk management are contrary to incentive 
aspects in general, e.g. excessive safety results in complacency and laziness [Pauly, 1968].  
Trade-offs get even more complicated if the state, or EU, or some other external supporter 
interfere in favor of positive externalities since subsidies modify also risks and incentives. 
Combining this with the high degree of uncertainty around innovation, we must be prepared 
that venture capital market will be neither complete (we cannot have an insurance for every 
future event), nor perfect (there may be significant frictions due e.g. to costs of transactions or 
agents), nor efficient (there may occur large mispricings). Also Kornai [2010] emphasizes that 
flexible and accessible financing is a key condition for widespread innovation. This means that 
a careful mechanism design can create high value.  
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In practice, complex contracts, screening mechanisms, and monitoring systems are developed 
to handle (or to reduce at least) the above problems [Karsai, 2013]. A frequently applied 
structure is stage financing, and it is common to give strong control rights to the external 
financer [Aman-Lovas, 2015, Lovas et al., 2015]. The main difference, however, between 
(active) financing of a venture capitalist and (passive) financing of a bank is that a venture 
capitalist participates actively in realizing the project by advising, reorganizing, networking, 
etc., and so she personally contributes to the success (or failure) of the project. Thus, we expect 
from an optimal financing scheme to motivate not just the entrepreneur but also the venture 
capitalist to make efforts, i.e. it should manage moral hazard on both sides. 
For the sake of simplicity, we disregard the problems arising from risk management, 
uncertainty, adverse selection, transaction cost, etc. (we assume that the parties are risk neutral, 
every decision parameter is known, both entrepreneurs and financers are homogeneous, there 
is no transaction cost), and focus on the effect of state subsidy on single and double moral 
hazard in financing. We investigate double moral hazard in a model where entrepreneur and 
financer are extremely interdependent: the project has a positive net present value only if both 
entrepreneur and financer do their best for the success. 
It is widespread in theoretical literature that state subsidy ruins incentives but helps to create 
positive externalities (increases free sources available), and the ultimate net change in welfare 
depends on which effect is stronger. There are mixed results in the literature concerning the 
empirical experiences [Karsai, 2015 and 2018; Jáki-Molnár 2017]. 
We prove the surprising result that in our model, the motivation of the entrepreneur entails the 
same for the venture capitalist automatically, hence there is no significant difference in handling 
single or double moral hazard. This convergence of interest goes wrong only in the case of a 
state guarantee. The form and size of state subsidy are important: investment subsidy and 
success fee may create value if done properly, but guarantee (or bailout) destroys incentives, 
therefore, its optimal size is zero even in the case of large positive externalities. Thus, we model 
the symptoms of soft budget constraint [Kornai et al, 2003], but we cannot explain why it pays 
off for the state to intervene in this form, thus its reasons should be outside the framework of 
the model.  
In Section 2, we present the optimal private financing contract assuming single or double moral 
hazard. In Section 3, the state enters as a new player providing investment subsidy, success fee, 
or bailout (guarantee), and we analyze the characteristics of the optimum with three players. 
Finally, in Section 4 we deduce conclusions of the investigation. 
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2. Private financing 
 
 
2.1. Single moral hazard 
 
For our analysis, we elaborate on several extensions of the basic model of Tirole [2006, p. 115] 
about private financing under single moral hazard. We assume that the investment has a fixed 
volume which can be neither enlarged, nor narrowed down. This model fits better to describe 
specific innovative projects than the variable-size model assuming constant return-to-scale, see 
e.g. [Csóka et al. 2013; Berlinger et al., 2017]. This latter is characteristic rather for developed 
industries, e.g. if we want to model their international expansion. Thus, the entrepreneur has a 
project which requires an initial investment I. The entrepreneur has, however, a smaller initial 
capital (investment asset) A. She must acquire the missing capital (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴) from external sources 
or has to give up the project and forget about its benefits. 
The project consists of a single period (from t=0 to t=1) and has two possible outcomes: either 
it succeeds with probability 𝑝𝑝, or fails with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑝. The total cash-flow of the project 
is R > 0, in the case of success, and zero in the case of failure, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Total cash-flow of the project  
 
Source: Tirole [2006, p.115.] 
 
In the case of single moral hazard, the probability of the success of the project (p) depends 
solely on the entrepreneur’s behavior. If the entrepreneur makes all efforts for the success, i.e. 
if she behaves, then the success has a high probability 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻, whereas low efforts induce a 
low probability  𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 of success (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 > 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿) [Tirole, 2006, p.115.].  
Misbehaving may occur in several forms, e.g. the entrepreneur is lazy (shirking); chooses a pet 
project, or one which makes her indispensable (entrenchment), or one providing more perks, or 
offering good circumstances to “help” friends and relatives. This latter takes us to illegal 
activities such as corruption, fraud, and stealing.  
Misbehaving may attract entrepreneurs by generating a private benefit B > 0 which can also be 
considered as personal expenses of good behavior. 
-I 
R 
0 
p 
1-p 
0. 1. 
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Moral hazard arises in the model because the financer cannot monitor the behavior of the 
entrepreneur. This is a special case of informational asymmetry where the relation between 
financer and entrepreneur can be described as a special principal-agent relationship. If the 
entrepreneur, i.e. the agent is not motivated properly, then she will focus on her own interest 
instead of the principal’s. Thus, moral hazard stems from rational profit maximization and not 
from low morality [Pauly, 1968]. We assume that the project’s private benefit (without 
externalities), i.e. its NPV (net present value) is positive only if behaving is guaranteed: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 > 0 > 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 
 
 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼 > 0 > 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐵𝐵 (1) 
 
Note that the project can be successful even in the case of the entrepreneur’s misbehaving but 
with a smaller probability. The success of the project depends not just on the entrepreneur but 
also on circumstances and on good or bad luck. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume similarly to the basic model [Tirole 2006, p. 115.] that 
the external financer expects zero rate of return (there is no time preference, parties are risk 
neutral, and financers are perfectly competitive), and the entrepreneur has a limited liability, so 
cannot be forced for further payments after investing her initial capital A.  It is the entrepreneur 
owning a special promising project, while there are many financers who are perfect substitutes 
for each other constituting thus a perfectly competitive market. The value is created on the 
entrepreneur’s side. The entrepreneur offers the contract and the financers compete. 
We can interpret private financing as a contract design problem where two questions must be 
answered: 
1. Will the project be financed? 
2. How should the entrepreneur and the financer share the profit? 
In the case of failure, the parties pay nothing to each other, so the second question asks how to 
distribute the income R between entrepreneur (𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏) and financer (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚) in the case of success. The 
contract must motivate the entrepreneur to behave. The inequality below expresses the 
condition that the entrepreneur’s expected income should not be less under behaving than under 
misbehaving (incentive constraint):  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + 𝐵𝐵 
After rearranging and applying ∆𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿, we obtain 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 ≥
𝐵𝐵
∆𝑝𝑝
 (2) 
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This implies that 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 must be at least 
𝐵𝐵
∆𝑝𝑝
, otherwise, the entrepreneur would be undermotivated. 
Hence, the entrepreneur cannot promise (in present value) more than 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 �𝑅𝑅 −
𝐵𝐵
∆𝑝𝑝
� called 
pledgeable income by [Tirole, 2006] and denoted by 𝜌𝜌.  
On the other hand, we have to ensure that participation is worth also for the financer. The 
financer is risk neutral and his expected rate of return is zero, it is sufficient if his expected 
income is not less than his investment was (participation constraint): 
 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴  
 
i.e. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 ≥
𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻
 (3) 
 
Constraints (2) and (3) imply (relying on 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚) that the project can be financed only if 
the entrepreneur has an initial capital at least ?̅?𝐴 (necessary condition for financing): 
 
𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̅?𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 − (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼) = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 �𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝� = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 (4) 
 
We can interpret (4) so that the NPV (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼) of the project and the entrepreneur’s initial 
capital (A) together should cover the agency cost 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻
𝐵𝐵
∆𝑝𝑝
. We can also say that the initial capital 
and the pledgeable income should be sufficient for the investment. 
Observe that (4) is also a sufficient condition of financing since we assumed that the 
competition of financers is perfect, so (3) holds with equality. The parameters and decision 
rules are known by both parties and the entrepreneur offers the contract, so the entrepreneur 
will declare only the minimal necessary capital 𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴. Thus, the entrepreneur’s initial capital 
in optimum is 
 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 (5) 
 
Hence, our answer to the above Question 1 of type “to be, or not to be” is that due to moral 
hazard, it can occur that even projects with very high NPV are not financed if the entrepreneur’s 
capital is not sufficient. This is moreover true if the entrepreneur’s potential private profit (B) 
is big under misbehaving and/or if good behavior improves just slightly the probability of 
success (∆𝑝𝑝 is small). 
Answering Question 2 about the sharing rule, the total profit (NPV) of the project remains at 
the entrepreneur, but she can get it only in the case of success, and this motivates her to make 
efforts. The expected value of the financer’s share equals just her investment:  
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 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 = 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻  (6) 
 
2.2. Double moral hazard 
 
The model of single moral hazard in the previous subsection can be generalized in several ways 
for the case of double moral hazard when the financer is not a bank but a venture capitalist who 
(hopefully) actively contributes to the success of the project. In this paper, we assume that the 
efforts of the entrepreneur and financer are perfect complements of each other. Sometimes, 
entrepreneur and financer can partly substitute each other, see e.g. [Tirole, 2006, p. 364.], but 
the model presented in this paper reflects the interdependence of the two parties better.  
Assuming perfect complements, the higher probability of success 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 can be achieved via efforts 
of both parties, and if any of them misbehaves, then the probability decreases to 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿, so the 
efforts of one player cannot make up the efforts of the other one. 
We keep assuming that the behavior of the players matters, i.e. there exists moral hazard. We 
have to modify (1) in order that even a joint misbehaving of both parties should not be worth 
for them: 
 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼 > 0 > 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 (7) 
 
where C denotes the venture capitalist’s private profit (in other words, the cost of her efforts, 
C>0). 
Note that (7) is stricter than (1), so we optimize on a smaller set and if something satisfies (7), 
then it automatically meets also (1).  
We require now, too, the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint (2) and the financer’s participation 
constraint (3). As a new condition, we have the venture capitalist’s incentive constraint which 
can be obtained similarly to the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 ≥
𝐶𝐶
∆𝑝𝑝
 (8) 
 
We claim that the optimal initial capital (5) deduced from (2) and (3) arising under single moral 
hazard is still optimal in this new situation. We just have to show that (5) satisfies also (8). This 
can be verified by a simple calculation relying on 
 ∆𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 > 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 (9) 
which is a consequence of (7). 
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Thus, it is a surprising result that in the model of double moral hazard assuming a perfect 
complementary relation between entrepreneur and financer, the optimal financing contract is 
the same as the one under single moral hazard. In other words, replacing a passive bank by an 
active venture capitalist does not influence the size of the entrepreneur’s initial capital to start 
the project, the entrepreneur must possess an initial capital ?̅?𝐴 now, too, to get finance.  
We note that the exact information about the other player’s private profit (B and C) is essential 
(common knowledge). However, in the case of informational asymmetry, i.e. if each player 
knows only her own private profit, then this involves not just moral hazard but also adverse 
selection which can be managed by sophisticated screening and signaling mechanisms [Lovas, 
2015]. In this aspect, the initial capital offered by the entrepreneur and the one required by the 
financer may grow to a very important factor.   
 
3. State subsidy 
 
In this section, we investigate what happens if the entrepreneur can finance her project not only 
from venture capital but also (fully or partially) from state subsidy. The operation of hybrid 
venture capital funds (i.e. funds combining private and public resources) is described in [Karsai, 
2018; Lovas-Riz, 2016; Jáki-Molnár, 2017]. 
We introduce positive spillover effects (externalities) (E > 0) into the double moral hazard 
model described in the previous section. These externalities appear independently from the 
success or failure of the project for example in the form of knowledge transfer, increased 
employment, or economic activity similarily to [Berlinger et al., 2017]. We suppose that 
externalities turn up in the state budget as explicit incomings at t=1. Of course, private players 
do not take these positive effects into consideration, these are important only for the state. We 
will see that state has interest in the realization of the project even if venture capital market is 
not functioning well, or if private financing is not available due to insufficient initial assets of 
the entrepreneur. 
The present value of state subsidy ?̃?𝑆 cannot exceed the extra budget income coming from 
externalities E (budget constraint): 
 ?̃?𝑆 ≤ 𝐸𝐸 (10) 
 
State subsidy is a non-refundable lump sum payment and can have three forms: it can be 
received at the beginning of the project (investment subsidy); or at the end of the project in the 
case of success (success fee); or in the case of failure (bailout or guarantee). We are still 
referring to Figure 1 where there are three states of the world: the present and the two possible 
future states. State subsidy forms under investigation relate to the so-called Arrow-Debreu 
securities, and more complex subsidy forms can be built up from these basic elements. 
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In the next subsections, we present models with three players: entrepreneur, venture capitalist, 
and state. Moral hazard can be double-sided on the part of the entrepreneur and/or the venture 
capitalist as in 2.2. We suppose (7), i.e. the behavior of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
matters from the point of view of NPV.  
There is no moral hazard related to the state because the state gives a passive support without 
participating in the realization of the project, hence her effort is not needed for the success. Of 
course, in reality, there may be inefficiencies and malfeasances during the determination of 
subsidy structures and the selection of the winning projects, but these are set aside, and we 
assume that state intervenes in an optimal way maximizing the aggregate utility of the project. 
The aggregate utility of the project (U) (in present value) is defined as the sum of the net present 
value (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) and the externalities (𝐸𝐸) of the project minus the present value of state subsidy 
(?̃?𝑆): 
 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + �𝐸𝐸 − ?̃?𝑆� = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 + 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 (11) 
 
This is a strong assumption because private benefits (NPV) and public benefits �𝐸𝐸 − ?̃?𝑆� are 
equally important to the state. Moreover, we exclude all public failures that can be relevant in 
practice, for example, in reality, state is composed of individuals following their self-interest 
and conflicting with each other, state does not have all the necessary information, and state can 
take not only economical but also political aspects into consideration when shaping its 
economic policy. In the following models, the state is infinitely well-intentioned, self-
consistent, omniscient, omnipotent, and maximizes welfare in the narrow sense of (11) under 
the budget constraint of (10). Due to these simplifying assumptions, we can focus on the 
behavior of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist and the related moral hazard issues. 
In the following, we introduce different state subsidy forms (investment subsidy, success fee, 
guarantee) one by one, thus we examine three different cases. We suppose that it is the 
entrepreneur who gets the state subsidy. 
When determining the optimal size of the state intervention, we have to consider some 
thresholds: 
- 0 is a lower bound excluding those situations when the state gives a negative 
subsidy, for example, taxes innovative projects. 
- 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚is an upper bound coming from the state’s budget constraint. 
- 𝑆𝑆̅ is a threshold (can be both upper bound and lower bound) where the 
entrepreneur is just able to get private financing from the venture capitalist which 
is also the threshold of good behavior of the entrepreneur.  
In general, the optimal size of state subsidy depends on the relative position of these thresholds: 
 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 = 𝑝𝑝(0, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑆𝑆̅) (12) 
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We define 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 in a special case by listing all relevant thresholds in a table, then describing 
their meaning and their possible relative positions, and finally maximizing (11).  
 
3.1. Investment subsidy 
In the case of an investment subsidy, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur (2) remains 
unchanged. However, the participation constraint of the financer (3) is modified, as due to state 
subsidy, the entrepreneur needs less outside financing to launch her project. 
  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴 − 𝑆𝑆 (13) 
 
The incentive constraint of the financer (8) does not change. As financers are perfectly 
competitive, (13) holds with equality. Expressing 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 from this and substituting it into (2), we 
get a necessary condition of private financing in the case of investment subsidy: 
 
𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̅?𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 − (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼) − 𝑆𝑆 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝑆𝑆 (14) 
 
As previously, we can suppose that (13) and (14) hold with equality. Expressing A from (14), 
computing 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 from (13), and substituting it into (8), we get by (7) that the incentive constraint 
of the financer holds automatically. Therefore, (14) is not only a necessary but also a sufficient 
condition of private financing. Intuitively, the entrepreneur can use state subsidy as her own 
capital to finance the investment, thus she needs less initial capital on her own.  
Table 4: State subsidy thresholds in the case of investment subsidy 
Sign Where to 
calculate 
from? 
Value Explanation 
𝑆𝑆̅ (14) (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴) − 𝜌𝜌 
 
- below this level, the project cannot 
be financed from private funds, 
because the good behavior of the 
entrepreneur is not ensured; 
- above this level, the state has no 
interest to give subsidy, because U 
would decrease  
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 (10) 𝐸𝐸 the state cannot give more due to its 
budget constraint 
 
It follows from 𝜌𝜌 > 0 that 𝑆𝑆̅ < 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴, i.e. state subsidy is smaller than the total outside financing 
need of the project, therefore, private financing is needed, as well. If the state is to maximize 
social utility U, it should give exactly 𝑆𝑆̅ if affordable under the budget constraint.  
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The possible relative positions and the optimal size of state subsidy (black dots) are presented 
in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Relative positions of thresholds in the case of investment subsidy 
 
In Case 1 of Figure 3, the optimal size of state subsidy is 𝑆𝑆̅ and a surplus of 𝐸𝐸 − 𝑆𝑆̅ will remain 
in the state budget. State subsidy creates value both at private and public levels as it completes 
the resources of the entrepreneur and makes the project real which could not have been financed 
by venture capitalists due to moral hazard.  
In Case 2 of Figure 3, the project has too small positive externalities, thus the maximum 
affordable state subsidy does not help to reach the level needed for private financing. In this 
case, the project is not worth to be subsidized, because private funds are not available due to 
moral hazard, so the project cannot be realized. 
The optimal size of state subsidy is, therefore: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 = �   𝑆𝑆̅            𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆̅ ≤  𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚    →  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏          0             𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆̅ >  𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚    → 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 � 
 
(15) 
Until now, we supposed that the entrepreneur reveals honestly how much initial capital she has. 
However, if the entrepreneur is rational and knows the reaction function (15) of the state, her 
optimal strategy is to declare an A which is just necessary to draw down the maximal state 
subsidy and to get private financing. At this point, 𝑆𝑆̅ = 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, therefore: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝐸𝐸 (16) 
 
which will be lower than it would have been without state subsidy as 𝐸𝐸 > 0 (cf. (5)). We can 
conclude that in the optimum (when all the three players are optimizing), state subsidy will be 
larger than necessary for the realization of the project and there will remain no surplus in the 
state budget (𝐸𝐸 − 𝑆𝑆̅ = 𝐸𝐸 − 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 0). In this way, the entrepreneur gets not only the entire 
NPV of the project but also its externalities E. In other words, the entrepreneur can internalize 
all the externalities with the help of state subsidy.  
 
 
Case 1
Case 2
𝑆𝑆̅
𝑆𝑆̅
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚0
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3.2. Success fee 
In the case of a success fee, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur (2) is changed: 
 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + 𝑆𝑆) ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + 𝑆𝑆) + 𝐵𝐵 (17) 
 
The participation constraint of the financer (3) holds again with equality. Using (3) and (17), a 
necessary condition of private financing is:  
 
𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̅?𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 − (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼) − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 (18) 
 
Similarly to the case of an investment subsidy, we can prove that with 𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, the 
venture capitalist’s incentive constraint (8) also holds. Therefore, (18) is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition of private financing.  
We see from (18) that the initial capital ?̅?𝐴 of the entrepreneur needed for private financing is 
decreased by the expected value of the success fee, hence now the private investor is willing to 
take larger stake from the investment than without a success fee. Consequently, in this structure, 
state subsidy is not crowding out, but on the contrary, it is boosting private funding by 
improving the incentives of the entrepreneur.  
Table 4: State subsidy thresholds in the case of a success fee 
Sign Where to 
calculate 
from? 
Value Explanation 
𝑆𝑆̅ (18) (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴) − 𝜌𝜌
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻
 
- below this level, the project cannot be 
financed from private funds, because the 
good behavior of the entrepreneur is not 
ensured; 
- above this level, the state has no interest 
to give subsidy, because U would 
decrease  
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚     (10) 𝐸𝐸
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻
 the state cannot give more due to its budget constraint 
 
The relative positions of the thresholds can be similar to those in Figure 3, so the optimal size 
of state subsidy is (15) as previously.  
This raises the question again about the optimal size of the initial capital A declared by the 
entrepreneur. It follows from the formula of 𝑆𝑆̅ in Table 4 that a smaller initial capital A leads to 
larger state subsidy 𝑆𝑆̅. The entrepreneur has interest in reducing A until 𝑆𝑆̅  takes its maximum, 
i.e. 𝑆𝑆̅ =  𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚. Using formulas in Table 4, we get 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝐸𝐸 exactly like in the case of 
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investment subsidy. Now again, the entrepreneur gets all the NPV and the externalities of the 
project.  
3.3. Bailout 
In the case of a bailout (or guarantee), the state promises implicitly or explicitly that the 
entrepreneur will be saved in a failure. This alters the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur: 
 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻)𝑆𝑆 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 + 𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿)𝑆𝑆 (19) 
 
The incentive constraint (3) of the private financer remains the same. Using (20) and (3), the 
necessary condition of private financing is modified, and the initial capital ?̅?𝐴 needed to start the 
project is increased relative to the base case:  
 
𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̅?𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 − (𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 − 𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 (20) 
 
In this case, an initial capital equal to  ?̅?𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 is not necessarily enough to ensure the 
motivation of the venture capitalist, this depends on the parameters, especially on C.  
So, we can conclude that a state guarantee has an opposite effect than success fee: it destroys 
incentives, thus compromises private financing and increases the initial capital needed. In the 
spirit of (11), a state-financed bailout creates no value, moreover, it destroys value as fewer 
projects can be realized due to the increased initial capital requirement, thus NPV and E get 
lost, whereas state expenses are increasing. In this model, therefore, the optimal size of a bailout 
is just zero.  
A bailout is not worth to introduce even if the entrepreneur has an initial capital 𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝐼𝐼 large 
enough to finance her project on her own. In this case, there is no need for private financing, 
but state subsidy may create perverse incentives for the entrepreneur to misbehave, hence the 
probability of success may drop down to 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 which makes NPV negative according to (7). The 
project will be realized even in this case as the entrepreneur has enough money and has the 
interest to finance it. Therefore, state guarantee either does not change or decreases the NPV of 
the project, it does not change the externality E, while it definitely increases state expenses, 
which is not a good deal for the state by (11). Therefore, a state guarantee decreases the project’s 
benefits U even if venture capital is not needed.  
Summing up, in these models, even large positive externalities do not justify state-financed 
bailout as it is just a present to the entrepreneur financed from public money which has no effect 
in the best case and effectively destroys incentives in the worst case.   
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4. Conclusions 
We can answer now the question in the title of the paper: There are many ways how the state 
can destroy innovation financing.  
The first problem is if the state spends too much on innovation financing and consequently 
neglects areas with weaker market mechanisms but of fundamental importance regarding not 
just innovation but the welfare of the entire community. Such areas are e.g. education and 
fundamental research.   
Besides allocational difficulties, several problems can occur also in designing and operating 
subsidy systems if the state is unable or unwilling to maximize social welfare. There is a long 
list of state failures due to informational problems, bureaucratic coordination, or corruption, but 
even the definition of social welfare might be problematic. In the models of this paper, we 
assumed that all the three parties, namely entrepreneur, venture capitalist, and state possess all 
necessary information, make decisions along clear goals, and know also the reaction functions 
of each other. If this is not the case, and it definitely does not hold in the real world, then we 
get a lower efficiency. 
A further difficulty can be if state subsidy harms the entrepreneur’s incentives, we focus mainly 
on this problem in this paper. In our models, this cannot occur with an investment subsidy and 
success fee. If also private funding is needed to start a project, then misbehavior is excluded 
since private financer enters only with this condition, so the mere fact of private financing has 
a disciplining effect. If the entrepreneur finances the project alone with the help of state subsidy, 
then success ensures her to get the total profit without sharing it with others. As we assumed 
that the project’s NPV is positive in the case of success and negative otherwise, it follows that 
the entrepreneur is motivated perfectly to make efforts in these circumstances, too. Hence, 
seemingly, an investment subsidy and success fee do not harm incentives, in fact, these get even 
improved in the frame of the model. This could be a nice example of cooperation between 
market and state where the latter compensates the missing capital bringing the project to a stage 
where private financing can already enter. State capital thus acts as a sort of catalyzer helping 
to realize projects which could not have been financed by the market without state subsidy. 
This sounds nice, but the situation is not that advantageous, unfortunately. The possibility of 
investment subsidy or success fee motivates entrepreneurs to declare less initial capital, just as 
much as needed to get maximal possible state subsidy. Then the state spends all the externalities 
on the project in optimum, and the entrepreneur gets this extra gift from the public money 
besides the NPV. There will be many projects which could have been financed by the market, 
and the positive externalities would have remained in the state budget for community purposes, 
but the possibility of state subsidy makes entrepreneurs hide their own capital, and thus acquire 
all or most externalities for themselves. The state can practically never know the number of 
projects which would have been aborted without the subsidy program versus the ones which 
would have been realized anyway, and the entrepreneur used state subsidy just to acquire an 
extra profit. If the rate of the latter projects is large, then even an optimal state subsidy structure 
is wasting public money. 
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A starting point of the models was assuming that state subsidy does not modify the private 
profits (B and C) arising from the players’ misbehavior. This is a realistic assumption in the 
case of shirking since the value of free time is always the same. Concerning other forms of 
abuse, however, state subsidy may even increase the private profits since state control may be 
weaker than the financer’s control. Moreover, this may occur not just on the entrepreneur’s side 
(B), but also on the financer’s side (C) depending on the construction. If this effect is significant, 
then also investment subsidy and success fee can destroy incentives and the total effect will be 
negative. 
By conditions of the model, guarantee (or bailout) acts as a perverse incentive, therefore, it is 
not recommended even with extremely large positive externalities. The optimal size of a state 
guarantee is zero in the model. In the real world, sometimes it may be conceivable that state 
guarantee still creates value, e.g. assuming risk-averse players when it is impossible or very 
hard to hedge risks on the capital markets, but we must be aware that this structure harms 
incentives seriously in any case and so the trade-off not necessarily pays off. 
The model of guarantee demonstrates the phenomenon of soft budget constraint [Kornai et al., 
2003] when the promise of state bailout perverts the behavior of the players and both the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are less willing to work for the success of the project. 
Our theoretical model, however, gives no hints about the state’s possible interest in a bailout, 
this must have reasons outside the model. Kornai et al. [2003] explain this phenomenon with 
time-inconsistent decision-making. 
Finally, we mention that the continuous investment model by Berlinger et al. [2017] found that 
state subsidy creates value anyway even in the form of guarantee in the case of single moral 
hazard. Their paper concluded that the problems occurring in practice are due to errors in 
realization and not to state subsidy. In their model, the private financer could convert the wrong 
subsidy form, i.e. guarantee into success fee. Thus, we can expect financial intermediaries to 
transform not only cash-flow and risks but also incentives. In the present paper, however, we 
assumed that the state subsidizes the entrepreneur directly and the financer cannot change the 
subsidy system afterward. This difference implies the explicitly negative effect of guarantee 
now. Therefore, designing subsidy systems, we have to pay a distinguished attention to the 
cooperation with financial intermediaries, including the timing of state subsidy and private 
financing. 
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